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SYMPOSIUM ON TRANSNATIONAL FUTURES OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW
INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW AND ITS OTHERS: GOVERNANCE BY NORM VERSUS
GOVERNANCE BY KNOWLEDGE
Liam McHugh-Russell*
Domestic laws are shaped by myriad global governance projects, which may attract the support of different
organizations, promote contrasting socioeconomic visions, and operate at diverse levels and scales.1 Beyond differences in their whos, whats, and wheres, governance projects are also differentiated by their hows: they may
embody different ways of imagining relations between order, authority, and legitimacy;2 operate through different
styles;3 or deploy different technologies.4 International legal regimes, which function through a logic of governance
that applies norms sanctioned by the political consent of states, have long operated alongside “systems of management and control” drawing their legitimacy from claims of “objective, disinterested scientiﬁc knowledge.”5
This essay explores how such “governance by knowledge”6 interacts with international law’s “governance by
norm,”7 through a case study of the World Bank’s Doing Business project and the International Labour Organization
(ILO)’s responses to it. I contend that Doing Business ultimately rests on “bad science,”8 and thus offers a potent
illustration of the power wielded by actors who claim “technical” knowledge. I argue that those who fail to engage
with the technicalities of the knowledge claims that ground projects like Doing Business, and who instead meet such
projects primarily through the idiom of (international) legal normativity, may have already lost the battle for
inﬂuence.
The Doing Business Project
Though Doing Business is usually identiﬁed with its annual reports, the project’s core activity is the annual production of eleven business regulation indicators for 190 countries. The indicators pose a “snapshot” of regulation
on themes ranging from the straightforward, such as access to electricity, to the highly contentious, such as
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employing workers.9 The indicators are based in part on whether national law guarantees speciﬁed rights to certain
actors and in part on the estimated time, cost, and number of steps involved for a business to conduct a given legal
or administrative task.
The project’s hallmark is its ranking of countries by a weighted aggregate of these indicators. Updated rankings and
scores are disseminated through annual reports, which also describe current methodologies, explore thematic case
studies, and elaborate on project rationales. The reports make the tacit message of the rankings explicit: reallocate
legal rights and reform legal practices to push each indicator score as high (or in some cases as low) as possible.
The project’s inﬂuence has been remarkable.10 National political leaders, including heavyweights in Russia,
India, and the United Kingdom, have made the Doing Business rankings a key benchmark for reforms.11 More
than ﬁfty states have government units mandated to respond to the project.12 Their efforts have had striking
results.13 Georgia climbed the ranking from one hundred to eleven between 2004 and 2011.14 Between 2016
and 2018, China moved from seventy-eight to forty-six, while India jumped up an astonishing ﬁfty-three spots,
to ﬁfty-seven.15
Qualitative studies tracing national reform processes16 have given the lie to perennial concerns that responses to
Doing Business are no more than paper-pushing and hot air.17 Sam Schueth, for example, has closely traced how
Doing Business drove mid-2000s reforms in Georgia that reshaped not only corporate law and property, customs,
and tax administration, but also labor law.18
Governance by Norm and Governance by Knowledge
How does the governance logic of the Doing Business project differ from that of international labor law? Doing
Business is framed as prescriptive rather than embodying a “normative” obligation with moral or legal force.19 It
purports to offer a technical means to an end desired by a unitary, domestic policy actor, not a norm of conduct
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that balances various social and economic interests.20 Its authority is grounded in the epistemic validity of (quasi)
objective data and statistical science, not the legitimacy afforded by an appropriate political process.21 As stated in a
high-level review that the Bank commissioned in 2008, the project is “anchored in research that links characteristics of a country’s business environment … to macroeconomic outcomes.”22 Speciﬁcally, the project draws much
of its authority from empirical data correlating indicator values with economic beneﬁts, and on (ultimately ﬂawed)
statistical methods that exploit differences in national “legal origins” to characterize those correlations as causal.23
The most palpable contrast between Doing Business and international labor law lies in their divergent socioeconomic agendas. The Doing Business approach to labor markets is consonant with a broader “ﬂexibility” agenda
aggressively pursued by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development.24 In line with this understanding of ﬂexibility,25 the project’s
Employing Workers indicator embodies a deregulatory approach to labor markets that, in practice, shifts signiﬁcant power over working conditions to employers.26 In its early years, the indicator was used by the Bank as a
template for numerous Bank-sponsored national labor law reforms.27
The labor dimensions of Doing Business met substantial challenges, on multiple fronts.28 The project’s entanglements with the broader ﬂexibility agenda make it hard to isolate political responses to the former from broader
resistance to the latter.29 Nonetheless, a number of actors expressly targeted the labor dimensions of Doing Business,
including, notably, the ILO itself.30
While ILO interventions deployed numerous critiques, its approach can be characterized as a synthesis of two
stratagems. The scientiﬁc stratagem critiqued various “methodological and conceptual problems” with the
Employing Workers indicator and its subcomponents.31 Those critiques suggested that the indicator did not
As shown in the examples of both Georgia and Sénégal, the implied addressees of Doing Business may be particularly amenable to “low
visibility strategies,” even at the highest levels. Adelle Blackett, Beyond Standard Setting: A Study of ILO Technical Cooperation on Regional Labor
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International Labour Ofﬁce, No. GB.300/PV paras. 109–32 (2007).
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adequately reckon with interactions between different labor market rules, appreciate the importance of law in
action, or account for the social and economic beneﬁts of labor market institutions alongside their economic costs.
The legal stratagem turned on claims that the reforms promoted by Doing Business conﬂicted with the spirit of
international labor law, and the letter of certain ILO Conventions.32 The legal stratagem combined that critique
with an appeal to international legal functionalism and interorganizational comity; the watchword was “policy
coherence.”33 Francis Maupain’s reading is paradigmatic. Invoking the concept of international legal fragmentation,34 Maupain characterizes incompatibilities between ILO activities and those of international ﬁnancial institutions as a matter of reconciling conﬂicting organizational mandates.35 His analysis interprets the World Bank’s
charter as a constitutional text and its approach to labor markets as doctrine.36 His reading of Doing Business is
thus framed as a case study in the legal subordination of the ILO’s social objectives to the Bank’s economic
functions.37
These two stratagems had a number of shortcomings. The issues raised by the scientiﬁc stratagem, though
crucial for theorizing labor institutions, had little critical purchase on Doing Business methods. The Doing Business
indicators are not based on “assumptions” about the effect of regulations,38 but on causal claims tied to statistical
analysis of empirical data. Balancing economic and social ends is incompatible with a methodology concerned with
tying particular actions to particular effects, which is likely why the invocation of international labor law standards
and their purposes seems so misplaced in the research that grounded the scientiﬁc stratagem.39
The legal stratagem, by contrast, did not fully appreciate the strategic context. There is a patent “functional incoherence” between the Employing Workers indicator and international labor law. Yet it is hard to pinpoint why this
tension should matter to proponents of Doing Business. Unlike the application of trade agreements by a WTO dispute
panel, the methodology, scores, and rankings deployed by Doing Business are not an exercise in legal interpretation.40
The “doctrine” the project promotes is not legally derivable from the World Bank’s mandate. In fact, it is only loosely
tied to the Bank’s legally-granted powers.41 Stated differently, the project does not express a norm that might notionally be integrated into the broader international legal ﬁeld, but a technical claim about how to achieve an end.42
eds., 2008); Sangheon Lee et al., The World Bank’s “Employing Workers” Index: Findings and Critiques – A Review of Recent Evidence, 147 INT’L LAB.
REV. 416 (2008); Janine Berg & Sandrine Cazes, Policymaking Gone Awry: The Labor Market Regulations of the Doing Business Indicators, 29 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 349 (2008). See also Santos, supra note 24, at 65–68; Paul Benjamin et al., The Cost of “Doing Business” and Labour Regulation:
The Case of South Africa, 149 INT’L LAB. REV. 73 (2010).
32
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33
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International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
35
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59.
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40
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42
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The outcome of the ILO’s intervention appears to be a good-news story for international “functional coherence.” In
2010, the World Bank quarantined the Employing Workers indicator from other parts of the report, and prohibited its
use in other Bank activities.43 Although funding provisos by the U.S. Congress were the proximate cause of these
changes,44 a broader view suggests that the shift resulted from an amalgam of international norms and local activism.45
Closer scrutiny reveals unintended, even perverse effects. The formal neutralization of the Employing Workers
indicator may have further reduced the visibility of World Bank strategies driving the ﬂexibility agenda.46
Moreover, ILO interventions were silent on the most salient fact about Doing Business methodology: the fundamental weaknesses in the modes of causal inference that support its policy guidance.47 Worse, those interventions
were expressed in diplomatic prose that signaled the ILO’s approval of the project’s overall design and aims.48 As a
result, the ILO may have ultimately bolstered the project’s legitimacy by chasing small changes to what gets measured, rather than fundamentally challenging how the project uses those measurements. Likewise, the ILO’s
appeals to international legal coherence may have given an air of legal authority to models and standards that
are in fact grounded in little more than mechanical objectivity and a rote showing of technical rigor.49 No binding
norm regulates the relative priority of the international system’s social and economic goals. This sometimes produces policy incoherence. But reading every conﬂict between international institutions as a problem of normative
ordering risks lending legal legitimacy to bad science.50
Conclusion
Global governance projects depend on different permutations of knowledge, power, and action. Such differences are the key theme of recent scholarship on governance by indicators,51 of which Doing Business is an archetype.52 Governance competitors to international law, however, are not limited to projects that rely on the ostensible
objectivity of numbers. For example, much of the technical cooperation conducted under the banner of development during the last seventy-ﬁve years, including by the ILO,53 has drawn its power more from the epistemic
authority of experts than the political legitimacy of its origins. It may be more useful to think in terms of this essay’s
distinction between governance by norm and governance by knowledge.
The power of Doing Business is of continuing concern for those willing to invoke “the spirit of international labor
law.” For example, the project continues to promote reforms on business registration and property administration
that exacerbate the exclusion of informal workers.54 For those concerned with the traditional subjects of international labor law, and those who for too long were its “others,” there is value in attending carefully to the “hows.”
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